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INTERPRETATION, REMEDY, AND THE RULE OF LAW:
WHY COURTS SHOULD HAVE THE COURAGE OF
THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL CONVICTIONS
RONALD A. CASS*
JACK M. BEERMANN**

“Constitutional avoidance is not a license to rewrite Congress’s work
to say whatever the Constitution needs it to say in a given situation.”
— Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,
140 S. Ct. 2183, 2207 (2020) (Roberts, C.J.)
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Arthrex 1
opens a window on a set of issues debated in different contexts
for decades. These issues—how to interpret statutes and
constitutional provisions, what sources to look to, whether so far
as possible to adopt interpretations that avoid declaring actions
of coordinate branches unconstitutional, and where such actions
* Dean Emeritus, Boston University School of Law; Distinguished Senior
Fellow, Gray Center for the Study of the Administrative State, George Mason
University; Senior Fellow, International Centre for Economic Research;
President, Cass & Associates, PC.
** Professor of Law and Harry Elwood Warren Scholar, Boston University
School of Law; Advisory Council, Gray Center for the Study of the
Administrative State, George Mason University.
Thanks are due to friends and colleagues for helpful comments and
discussions, including Jonathan Adler, Lisa Bressman, Thomas B. Griffith, Tara
Leigh Grove, Helen Hershkoff, Kristin Hickman, Michael McGinley, Aaron
Nielson, Richard Pierce, Fred O. Smith, Mila Sohoni, Christopher Walker,
Matthew Wiener, Adam White, and participants in the C. Boyden Gray Center
for the Study of the Administrative State Roundtable on Judicial Review of
Agency Actions. In addition, the authors are grateful for research assistance
ably provided by Samuel Beermann, Boston University School of Law class of
2024, and Daniella Cass, University of Pennsylvania-Carey Law School, J.D.,
2022. As is common, the authors take responsibility for any errors that remain.
Differences of opinion, however, are another story.
1 141 S. Ct. 1970 (2021).
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are deemed to have been unconstitutional whether to provide
remedies that cabin the most significant implications of such a
declaration—go to the heart of the judicial role and the division
of responsibilities among the branches of government.
The Arthrex case challenged a decision of the Patent Trial and
Appeal Board (PTAB), an entity within the Department of
Commerce that is composed of more than 200 Administrative
Patent Judges (APJs) plus a Director and Deputy Director of the
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), and the PTO’s
Commissioner for Patents and Commissioner for Trademarks.2
While the Director is appointed by the President and confirmed
by the Senate, APJs and the other members of PTAB are
appointed by the Secretary of Commerce. No provision of the
America Invents Act, which created the process involved in
Arthrex, provided for review of PTAB decisions by the Director
or another principal officer. As a result, the Court held that APJs
exercised unreviewable discretionary authority which made
them principal “officers of the United States” whose
appointment constitutionally must be made by the President
with confirmation by the Senate. Had the APJs been “inferior
officers”—subject to control by superior officers—they properly
could have been appointed by the Secretary.
Instead of holding the challenged PTAB decision to be
unlawful, however, the Court (by a plurality of justices) held
that the statutory provisions that effectively precluded review of
PTAB decisions by the Director should be severed from the law
as unconstitutional. That step, the plurality said, transformed
APJs into inferior officers subject to the Director’s control. In
other words, the remedy for an unconstitutional administrative
decision, was to make it constitutional by revising the law. With
that remedy in place, Arthrex won the battle but lost the war.
The Arthrex Court’s application of the constitutional test for
appointments to the statute at issue—whether the Director of the
PTO lacked a means for reviewing and potentially
countermanding a particular PTAB decision—is sensible,
although open to question. As discussed below, both the test

2

See 35 U.S.C. § 6(a), (c).
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itself—especially its fidelity to earlier decisions—and its
application in Arthrex are contested.3
Our principal focus, however, is on the question of remedy.
When the Court’s members find that a plausible—really, the
most plausible—reading of a law would make it
unconstitutional, what should the Court do? Many Supreme
Court pronouncements and much academic commentary
suggest that courts should interpret statutes to be consistent
with the Constitution whenever possible, even if that requires
some degree of judicial creativity. That instinct has a long and
distinguished pedigree, but it is ultimately a much-overstated
direction to the courts.
Although courts often, and sensibly, choose between two
plausible interpretations of a statute to avoid a finding of
unconstitutionality, the Court’s revision of the statute involved
in Arthrex is jarring. Not only did the Court rewrite the law to
remove the provision that prevented supervision of APJs by the
PTAB’s Director; it effectively read an implicit review power
into the statute where no such power was granted by the law’s
text. The approach taken in Arthrex is not without precedent,
but it both strains against the weight of precedent and reflects
an unfortunate inclination to sacrifice at least one aspect of the
judicial role to practical grounds for remedial modesty.
Part II of this article reviews the background and opinions in
Arthrex. Part III describes the precedents respecting remedies for
structures that the Supreme Court has found violate
constitutional requirements. We return in that Part to the
reasons that Arthrex’s remedy is at odds with generally accepted,
and well-grounded, approaches to dealing with separation-ofpowers problems. Part IV considers arguments for different
approaches to interpretation and remedy when the Supreme
Court faces potential constitutional concerns. This Part
concludes with discussion of pragmatic problems that Arthrexstyle remedies pose for decisionmaking by Congress and the
Court.

3

See infra, text at nn. 14–25.
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II. ARTHREX: APPOINTMENTS AND DISAPPOINTMENT IN
REMEDYING CONSTITUTIONAL DEFECTS
A. Patent Contests: The Context for Arthrex
Patents in the United States are granted by the United States
Patent and Trademark Office, an agency within the Department
of Commerce headed by the Undersecretary of Commerce for
Intellectual Property who also holds the title of Director of the
PTO. Once a patent is granted, there is more than one way to
challenge its validity both in the agency and in court, including
by seeking a declaratory judgment and as a defense in an
infringement action or in an action to collect unpaid royalties.
The America Invents Act established an additional method for
challenging patents within the agency: an interested person may
seek “inter partes review” before the PTAB.
The inter partes review procedure is quite simple. The
challenger files a petition to institute inter partes review and the
Director makes the “final and unappealable” determination of
whether to go forward with the process.4 If the Director makes a
favorable determination, the petition is then referred to a panel
consisting of “at least 3 members” of PTAB “designated by the
Director.” 5 A dissatisfied party may seek rehearing, which by
statute may be granted only by PTAB.6 This could imply action
either by the panel itself or the entire PTAB, consisting of more
than 200 APJs plus a handful of others including the Director.
Judicial review may also be sought in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 7 Because the statute specifies
that PTAB issues a “final written decision” on patentability 8 and
provides for no other method of internal agency review, the
Arthrex Court correctly concluded that PTAB’s decisions on inter
partes review are final as far as the Executive Branch is
concerned: “no principal officer at any level within the Executive
Branch” has the power to review this aspect of the APJs’ work.9
35 U.S.C. § 314(d).
35 U.S.C. § 6(c).
6 35 U.S.C. § 6(c).
7 35 U.S.C. §§ 141(c).
8 35 U.S.C. § 318(a).
9 Arthrex, 141 S. Ct., at 1980.
4
5
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B. The Arthrex Litigation
Arthrex, Inc., owns a patent on a “surgical device for
reattaching soft tissue to bone without tying a knot.” After
Arthrex won a jury verdict based on infringement of this patent
by Smith & Nephew, Inc., and its subsidiary ArthroCare Corp.,
Smith & Nephew sought inter partes review in PTAB of the
validity of the patent.10 The Director agreed to commence inter
partes review of the patent, and the PTAB panel found Arthrex’s
patent invalid based on the content of “prior art” respecting the
claimed invention. 11 Arthrex disputed that conclusion in part
because the alleged prior art was contained in “the inventors’
own original application.”12
Arthrex sought judicial review of the PTAB decision in the
Federal Circuit. The Court of Appeals did not rule on the
validity of the patent. Instead, it held that the PTAB APJs were
principal officers whose appointment by the Secretary of
Commerce was invalid. Rather than reinstate Arthrex’s patent,
the Federal Circuit invalidated the for-cause removal
protections that applied to the APJs, deciding that this would
transform them into inferior officers who were properly
appointed by the Secretary of Commerce. The Federal Circuit
then remanded the case to PTAB for a new hearing before a
different panel of APJs, presumably chosen by the Director.
No one involved was happy with the Federal Circuit’s
decision. Both the United States Government and Smith &
10 After the jury verdict, while post-trial motions were pending, the parties
agreed to settle the case with an express reservation of Smith & Nephew’s right
to seek inter partes review, thus preventing Arthrex from raising any
preclusion defense based on the jury verdict. See Smith & Nephew’s Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari at 7, in United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1970
(2021) (available at 2020 WL 3651171 (June 29, 2020)).
11 An invention must be “novel” to be patentable; novelty is measured
against “prior art,” i.e. information or earlier inventions that were publicly
available before the filing of the patent application that anticipated the new
invention. See 35 U.S. C. §102(a). The statute itself contains no definition of
“prior art” which means that federal courts have been forced to develop an
understanding of prior art with minimal legislative guidance. See Tun-Jen
Chiang, Defining Patent Scope by the Novelty of the Idea, 89 WASH. U.L. REV. 1211,
1246-47 (2012).
12 Brief for Respondent Arthrex, Inc. at 9, in United States v. Arthrex, 141 S.
Ct. 1970 (2021).
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Nephew disagreed with the conclusion that the APJs were
principal officers. Arthrex also was dissatisfied with the remedy.
It preferred a decision reinstating its patent rather than
subjecting it to another round of inter partes review and argued
that the entire process of inter partes review should be struck
down. Thus, all parties sought Supreme Court review of the
circuit’s decision, which the Court granted.
On review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Federal Circuit
that the APJs were principal officers but found that subjecting
the APJs’ decision to review by the Director “better reflects the
structure of supervision within the PTO and the nature of APJs’
duties.” The Supreme Court’s remedy was to remand the case
to PTAB. It did not direct PTAB to hold a new hearing before a
different panel. Instead, the Court remanded to allow the
Director to decide whether to rehear Smith & Nephew’s petition
in light of its decision that the best reading of the statute—the
reading that would make the law constitutional—is that it must
allow the Director to review all PTAB decisions on inter partes
review.13
C. APJs as Principal Officers
As already noted, our primary focus in this article is on the
remedy. Nonetheless, a brief detour is in order to discuss the
Court’s determination that under the pre-Arthrex PTAB
structure the APJs were indeed principal officers.
The Appointments Clause of the Constitution provides that
Officers of the United States are appointed by the President with
the advice and consent of the Senate. Congress may, however,
provide by law for a different method of appointment for
“inferior officers,” namely appointment by the President alone,
by a Department Head, or by a Court of Law. 14 All of these
statutory alternatives presumably allow appointment without
Senate confirmation—otherwise, the provision for presidential
appointment would be redundant of the Constitution’s default
provision for appointment of officers and the remainder of the
13 Arthrex, 141 S. Ct. at 1987 (“we hold that 35 U.S.C. § 6(c) is unenforceable
as applied to the Director insofar as it prevents the Director from reviewing the
decisions of the PTAB on his own.”).
14 U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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clause would be incongruous. The statute creating PTAB
specified that APJs were “appointed by the Secretary” of
Commerce, a Department head, in consultation with the
Director, a method of appointment implying that Congress
believed them to be inferior officers.15 APJs could be removed,
also by the Secretary of Commerce, but only for “such cause as
will promote the efficiency of the service.”16
The determination of whether a particular officer is principal
or inferior turns largely on application of the Supreme Court’s
decision in the Edmond case.17 In Edmond, the Court, accepting a
position that commanded only a single justice’s vote less than a
decade before, 18 specified that “[w]hether one is an ‘inferior
officer’ depends on whether he has a superior” other than the
President.19 In Edmond, the Court determined that judges on the
Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals (within the executive
branch) were inferior officers, largely because the Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces (also within the executive branch)
had the power to review and reverse the Coast Guard court’s
decisions 20 but also because the Judge Advocate General had
authority to prescribe rules of procedure for the court and had
power to remove the judges from the court without cause. 21
While the PTO Director has power to prescribe rules governing
many aspects of PTAB procedures,22 as noted above the Director
cannot overturn panel decisions and cannot remove APJs
without good cause. In the eyes of the Arthrex Court, this made
APJs principal officers.
Although this appears to be a reasonable conclusion, Justices
Thomas, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan dissented, finding that
the supervisory powers of the Director and the Secretary of
Commerce were sufficient to make the APJs inferior officers.
Most notably, Justice Thomas insisted that the Court misapplied
Edmond, stating quite strongly that “[t]here can be no dispute
35 U.S.C. § 6(a).
5 U.S.C. § 7513(a); 35 U.S.C. § 3(c).
17 Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997) (Edmond).
18 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 719-23 (1988) (Scalia, J. dissenting).
19 Arthrex, 141 S. Ct. at 1980, quoting Edmond, 520 U.S. at 662.
20 Edmond, 520 U.S. at 665.
21 Id. at 664-65.
22 35 U.S.C. § 316.
15
16
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that administrative patent judges are, in fact, inferior: They are
lower in rank to at least two different officers” namely the
Director and the Secretary of Commerce.23 In Justice Thomas’s
view, the APJs were subject to greater supervision than the
Coast Guard judges in Edmond: the Director sets their rate of pay
and prescribes procedural rules and other policies governing
PTAB proceedings including matters such as discovery, oral
argument, termination of trial, notice, privileges and filing fees.
The Director also has power to determine whether a party
should be joined to a proceeding, may issue policy directives
governing PTAB operation, decides which of the “250-plus
[APJs] hear certain cases and may remove [APJs] from their
specific assignments without cause.” 24 Justice Thomas cited
additional powers of the Director that are either explicit or
implicit in the structure of the PTAB, such as the power to decide
whether inter partes review happens at all, the power to assign
a particular case to a panel consisting of herself, the Deputy
Director and the Commissioner of Patents, the power to
designate certain decisions as precedential and the alleged
power, which is unclear from the statute, to add members to a
panel and order the case reheard.25
There is much to be said in support of the approaches taken
by both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, especially in
light of the relative dearth of precedent on the question of
principal officer status. The Chief Justice’s approach seems
consistent with a preference for clear and relatively simple rules
while Justice Thomas’s may be more consistent with what little
precedent there is and more deferential to Congress. In any case,
after Arthrex, it appears that any official with final
decisionmaking authority for the Executive Branch on an
important matter such as the validity of a patent is likely to be
considered a principal officer who must be appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate. This
provides a simpler starting point than Justice Breyer’s functional
approach or the more nuanced standard that Justice Thomas
sees in Edmond. Whether the Chief Justice’s approach leads to
Arthrex, 141 S. Ct. at 2000 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2001.
25 Id. at 2002.
23
24
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greater clarity or better results remains to be seen. That question,
however, is beyond our focus. We turn now to our primary
concern, the remedy.
III.

REMEDYING UNCONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES BEFORE
ARTHREX: VACATIONS AND STAYS

Both the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court rejected
Arthrex’s plea to invalidate the entire system of inter partes
review. The Federal Circuit determined that making the APJs
subject to removal without cause by the Director was sufficient
to convert them into inferior officers. Without stating that this
was insufficient, the Supreme Court took a different tack and
found that it was more appropriate to subject PTAB decisions to
review by the Director. Before exploring the Court’s reasoning
in support of its remedial decision, we review some of the
Court’s previous decisions on remedies in cases involving
unconstitutional appointment and removal provisions.
Numerous Supreme Court decisions have addressed
challenges to actions of government officials whose
appointments were alleged to be unconstitutional. Prior to
Arthrex, in the two successful challenges to appointments of
officials exercising executive authority, the Court prevented the
agency from taking action until the appointment problems were
cured. 26 In one, the Court invalidated the assignment of
executive authority to the agency, leaving it to Congress to
determine whether to reconstitute the agency with officers
eligible to perform the agency’s assigned duties.27 In the other,
the Court held that the officers were improperly appointed, and
it affirmed a Court of Appeals decision vacating the order that
had been issued by the improperly appointed officials.28
In cases invalidating restrictions on the President’s power to
remove officers, the Court usually has excised the removal
restriction from the statute without otherwise affecting the
agency’s operations.29 In sum, the Court has generally imposed
26 See Lucia v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
27 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
28 See Lucia v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).
29 See infra, text at nn. 40–45.
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a narrow remedy, invalidating the action found to violate the
constitutional assignment of powers among the branches but
otherwise leaving the process involved intact.30 There have been
few, if any, prior cases in which the Court has altered an
agency’s process as much as it did in Arthrex in order to preserve
the constitutionality of an agency’s function.
A. Vacating Rulings by Unconstitutionally Constituted Authorities
(1) Appointments
The modern era of appointments disputes began with Buckley
v. Valeo,31 involving the constitutionality of numerous aspects of
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 as amended in 1974
in the wake of the Watergate scandal.32 The 1974 amendments
created the Federal Election Commission (FEC), an eightmember body charged with enforcing numerous aspects of the
Act. The act specified that the FEC included two ex officio nonvoting members, the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the
House of Representatives, and six voting members, two
appointed by the President, two appointed by the Speaker of the
House and two appointed by the President pro tempore of the
Senate. All appointments were subject to the advice and consent
of both Houses of Congress. This appointment structure was a
blatant violation of the Appointments Clause. No Member of
Congress may appoint an Officer of the United States, and,
although the Court did not reach the issue, it is also plain that
only the Senate may exercise the advice and consent power over
such appointments.33
Once the Court determined that the appointments of FEC
members were unconstitutional, it turned to the remedy. Here,
the Court determined that the FEC members could retain their
positions but they could not perform those functions that the
See infra, text at nn. 52–56.
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
32 Federal Election Campaign Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 93-443, 88 Stat.
1263 et. Seq. (1974).
33 424 U.S. at 127-28. Larry Alexander and Saikrishna Prakash have
characterized the possibility that Congress might delegate the Senate’s power
to confirm presidential nominations, not merely as delegation “running riot,”
but as “delegation really running riot.” See Larry Alexander & Saikrishna
Prakash, Delegation Really Running Riot, 93 VA. L. REV. 1035, 1076-77 (2007).
30
31
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Constitution reserves to properly appointed Officers of the
United States. The Court noted that the Appointments Clause
does not govern the appointment of officials who act “merely in
aid of the legislative function of Congress” and thus the
Commission could continue to collect information and conduct
investigations concerning the conduct of campaigns. This
preserves Congress’s authority to appoint its own officials. As
appointed, however, the Commissioners could not exercise the
enforcement, rulemaking and adjudicatory functions assigned
to it by the Act. As the Court explained, only properly appointed
Officers of the United States may perform “a significant
governmental duty exercised pursuant to a public law.” 34
In sum, the Court’s remedy in Buckley was to forbid the
improperly appointed officials from exercising those functions
that may be performed only by properly appointed Officers of
the United States. It does not appear that the Court considered
reforming the appointments process by granting the President
the power to appoint all six Commissioners, subject only to the
advice and consent of the Senate. The Court’s decision
effectively forced Congress, if its members wanted to continue
the FEC’s central functions, to legislate a revised method for
appointing Commissioners, which it did shortly after the
decision.35
The Court took a similar remedial tack in Lucia v. SEC. 36
Before Lucia, the SEC’s Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) were
appointed by SEC staffers, not the members of the Commission
themselves. The Court found that the ALJs exercised powers
reserved to Officers of the United States, a fairly obvious
conclusion in light of prior decisions.37 Because this method of
424 U.S. at 131.
When Congress amended the statute to conform to the Appointments
Clause, it left intact the ex officio non-voting membership of the Secretary of
the Senate and Clerk of the House of Representatives. This was struck down
as a violation of the Appointments Clause by the D.C. Circuit in FEC v. NRA
Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821 (D.C. Cir 1993). In that case, the court vacated
the Commission’s enforcement order against the NRA, stating that “we are
aware of no theory that would permit us to declare the Commission’s structure
unconstitutional without providing relief to the appellants.” Id. at 828.
36 Lucia v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).
37 See Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991).
34
35
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appointment was improper, the Court determined that the ALJ’s
decision against Lucia could not stand and that Lucia was
entitled to a new hearing before a properly appointed ALJ. 38
Rather than invalidate the entire process or determine that the
improperly appointed ALJs were out of a job irrevocably, the
justices held that the improperly appointed ALJs, just like the
FEC members in Buckley, could not perform the decisional
functions assigned to them.39 During the course of litigation, the
SEC Commissioners had “ratified” the appointments of the
agency’s ALJs. The Court did not decide whether that
ratification made the then-current SEC ALJs appropriate officers
to preside over the rehearing of Lucia’s case, going only so far as
to determine that the prior decision must be vacated and that the
ALJ who had decided Lucia’s case could not preside over a
rehearing.
(2) Removal Cases
In cases challenging improper restrictions on the President’s
power to remove Officers of the United States, the Court’s
remedy generally has been to excise the removal restriction and
allow the agency to function as before. This is unsurprising as
invalidation of a removal restriction merely requires severing
one provision of the statute—the removal restriction—while
allowing the remainder of the statute to function as before. The
alternative would be invalidation of actions taken by officials
functioning under the unlawful removal restriction, an extreme
result inconsistent with modern severability doctrine.
The practice of invalidating a removal restriction while
preserving the remainder of the administrative function goes
138 S. Ct. at 2055.
In the only other relatively recent case in which a method of appointing
agency officials was held to violate the Appointments Clause, the Court held
the appointments invalid, and the officials had to be removed from office.
NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513 (2014). In Noel Canning, the Court
invalidated President Obama’s recess appointments to the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) as not complying with the constitutional requirements
governing recess appointments, resulting in the dismissal of three purported
members of the NLRB. The Court treated the remedy as obvious, as there was
no doubt that members of the NLRB are Officers of the United States, no
available statutory remedy to the problem, and no change in procedure that
might have validated the appointments.
38
39
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back to the very first Supreme Court decision on removal, Myers
v. United States. 40 In that case, the Court struck down the
statutory requirement for Senate consent prior to presidential
removal of some Senate-confirmed officials. (Refusal to comply
with this requirement was a basis for the impeachment of
President Andrew Johnson.)41 The remedy in Myers was simply
to invalidate the requirement of Senate consent, severing that
requirement from the remainder of the agency structure.42
The few instances in which the Court has invalidated a
removal restriction follow the remedial choice made in Myers—
i.e., the Court has severed the problematic removal restriction
and allowed the agency to exercise its administrative
responsibilities. For example, in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board, 43 in which the Court
established its rule against two levels of insulation from at-will
presidential removal, the Court decreed that members of the
PCAOB must be removable by the SEC without cause. And
when it established44 and applied45 its rule that single heads of
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (Myers).
See Act of March 2, 1867, 14 Stat. 430 (1867). The impetus behind Congress’s
initial adoption of this requirement was to prevent Johnson from dismissing
Secretary of War Edwin Stanton and other members of Abraham Lincoln’s
cabinet. See DAVID O. STEWART, IMPEACHED: THE TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON
AND THE FIGHT FOR LINCOLN’S LEGACY 75-77 (Simon & Schuster 2009); ERIC L.
MCKITRICK, ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION 490 (Univ. of Chicago
Press 1960).
42 Myers, 272 U.S. at 176–77.
43 561 U.S. 477 (2010) (Free Enterprise Fund).
44 See Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183
(2020) (Seila Law).
45 See Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761 (2020) (Collins). The decision in Collins
can be viewed as an extension rather than an application of Seila Law because
in Seila Law the Court appeared to rely at least in part on the extent of CFPB’s
powers when it concluded that the President must have the power to remove
the CFPB director at-will. See 140 S. Ct. at 2204 (“With no colleagues to
persuade, and no boss or electorate looking over her shoulder, the Director
may dictate and enforce policy for a vital segment of the economy affecting
millions of Americans.”). Justice Kavanaugh, while on the D.C. Circuit,
similarly found it significant that the Director of the CFPB exercised “massive
power.” PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 839 F.3d 1, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2016), vacated and
contrary result reached en banc in PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir.
2018). In Collins, however, the Supreme Court disavowed this power-based
aspect of Seila Law. See Collins, 141 S. Ct. at 1784 (“The President's removal
40
41
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independent agencies must be subject to at-will presidential
removal, the Court preserved the agencies’ functions and simply
excised agency heads’ removal protections.
The only apparent deviation from this pattern is not really an
exception but an exceptional case in which the problem was not
the imposition of a removal restriction but rather the identity of
the entity empowered to remove the official. Bowsher v. Synar46
involved the constitutionality of delegating authority to the
Comptroller General of the United States to establish binding
limits on federal spending. The problem is that the Comptroller
General, who is the head of the Government Accountability
Office (formerly the General Accounting Office), is removable,
for cause, not by the President but by a Joint Resolution of
Congress.
The Court in Bowsher decided that congressional control over
the Comptroller’s removal was incompatible with his exercise of
executive power. The Court’s remedy was similar to what the
Court has done in appointments clause cases: it prohibited the
Comptroller General from establishing binding targets on the
ground that an official removable by, and thus beholden to,
Congress cannot exercise the functions of an Officer of the
United States.47 The Court explained that it chose this remedy,
rather than invalidating Congress’s power to remove the
Comptroller General, because it had always been understood
that the GAO is an agency of Congress rather than the Executive
Branch and the GAO’s responsibilities primarily involved
serving Congress as a sort of watchdog over government
spending. Thus, the Court declined to “perform the type of
creative and imaginative statutory surgery urged by
power serves vital purposes even when the officer subject to removal is not the
head of one of the largest and most powerful agencies.”) It now appears that
the Court has constructed a per se rule against insulation from presidential
removal for the single head of an independent agency. President Biden, relying
on this interpretation of Collins and Seila Law, fired the head of the Social
Security Administration without relying on a claim of good cause as required
the governing statute. See Jim Tankersley, Biden Fires Trump Appointee as Head
of Social Security Administration, Jul. 9, 2021, NY TIMES, available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/09/business/biden-social-securityadministration.html.
46 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
47 478 U.S. at 732, 735–36.
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appellants”48 and instead held that the Comptroller could not be
“entrusted with executive powers.”49
B. Constitutional Rulings and Retroactivity
In all the cases discussed above, severability doctrine justified
the Court’s willingness to excise unconstitutional provisions
rather than invalidate entire regulatory structures. The
severability inquiry is supposed to be aimed at Congress’s
intent: would Congress have preferred excision or total
invalidation? Often, however, this inquiry is more imagined
than real, for in many cases it is well-nigh impossible to predict
what the enacting Congress’s collective reaction would have
been to the possibility that a method of appointment, restriction
on removal, or other statutory feature might be invalid.
Often, Congress assists in this inquiry by including a
severability clause in the statute itself. Typically, such clauses
provide that the invalidity of one provision does not affect the
validity of the remainder of the statute. Even then, difficult
questions can arise over the scope of severability. For example,
in INS v. Chadha, 50 relying on a severability clause, the Court
invalidated and excised a one-House veto over the Justice
Department’s decision to suspend the deportation of a
deportable alien. This, in effect, made the suspension decision
final and unreviewable. In dissent, Justice Rehnquist pointed out
that “Congress consistently rejected requests from the Executive
for complete discretion in this area . . . and always insisted on
retaining ultimate control.” Thus, he and Justice White would
have found the veto provision unseverable from the remainder
of the suspension procedure despite the presence of the
severability clause. While we have sympathy for Justice
Rehnquist’s skepticism over Congress’s willingness to give up
control over the process, and we are aware that the Court
continues to examine Congress’s likely intent even in the
presence of a severability clause, 51 in our view the better course
478 U.S. at 736.
478 U.S. at 731.
50 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
51 See National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sibelius, 567 U.S. 519,
586-588 (2012) (“The other reforms Congress enacted, after all, will remain
‘fully operative as a law,’ and will still function in a way ‘consistent with
48
49
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is for the Court to take Congress at its word and apply the
severability clause whenever what remains is workable, leaving
to Congress the task of cleaning up any problems it might have
caused by including the clause.52
Notice also that when a regulated party has challenged an
agency’s adverse action, the Court has invalidated the action if
it was taken by an improperly appointed official. That is, the
Court’s decisions applied retroactively to remedy the
constitutional problem in the case at hand. In Lucia, for example,
the SEC’s order against Lucia was invalidated and the case was
remanded for a new hearing before a properly appointed ALJ
(or the Commission itself). This approach is typical of court
remedial actions on review of, and finding invalidity of, agency
decisions.
In contrast, there have been cases in which the Court has
recognized that its decision would be so disruptive that it has
applied its holding only prospectively and allowed time for
Congress to step in to remedy the constitutional infirmity. The
most prominent example of this is the Northern Pipeline case,53 in
which the Court invalidated a provision of the federal
Bankruptcy Act that granted jurisdiction over certain state
common law claims to the non-Article III bankruptcy courts.
Primarily because “retroactive application . . . would surely visit
substantial injustice and hardship upon those litigants who
relied on the Act’s vesting of jurisdiction in the bankruptcy
courts,” the Court held that the decision would apply
prospectively only, allowing decisions made previously to stand
despite the fact that they were rendered by a tribunal without
constitutional jurisdiction.54 The Court also delayed the effective
date of its judgment for three months to “afford Congress an
opportunity to reconstitute the bankruptcy courts or to adopt
Congress' basic objectives in enacting the statute.’ Confident that Congress
would not have intended anything different, we conclude that the rest of the
Act need not fall in light of our constitutional holding.” (citations omitted));
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987).
52 See Michael D. Shumsky, Severability, Inseverability, and the Rule of Law, 41
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 227, 234–37 (2004) (arguing that courts should treat
severability clauses as dispositive.)
53 Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50
(1982).
54 458 U.S. at 88.
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other valid means of adjudication, without impairing the
interim administration of the bankruptcy laws.”55 This in effect
allowed the bankruptcy courts to continue to exercise
unconstitutional jurisdiction while Congress constructed a
solution.
Similarly, in Buckley, the Court applied the “de facto validity”
doctrine and upheld the actions that had been taken by the
Federal Election Commission before the Court decided that the
commission’s members had been appointed unconstitutionally.
The Court also stayed its judgment in Buckley for 30 days to
“afford Congress an opportunity to reconstitute the
Commission by law or to adopt other valid enforcement
mechanisms without interrupting enforcement of the provisions
the Court sustains, allowing the present Commission in the
interim to function de facto in accordance with the substantive
provisions of the Act.” 56 These remedial determinations
demonstrate a facet of the Court’s remedial practice which is
relevant to what it did in the Arthrex case: the Court often
attempts to minimize the disruption to agency functioning
caused by its decisions even if that perpetuates an
unconstitutional structural feature.
C. Arthrex’s Remedy: Adding Insult to Injury?
As noted, Arthrex argued that the remedy for improper
appointment of APJs should have been to invalidate the entire
system of inter partes review. Although this may appear to be
an extreme request, it would actually have been consistent with
prior cases, such as Buckley, in which the Supreme Court
determined that improperly appointed officials could not
exercise powers reserved to Officers of the United States.
Similarly, Arthrex was arguing that the APJs could not exercise
a function reserved to principal officers, i.e., the power to make
the Executive Branch’s final decision on the validity of a patent.
The Federal Circuit’s approach was to convert the APJs to
inferior officers (or, at least, to confirm their status as inferior
officers) by making them removable without cause by the
Director. In Arthrex’s view, however, this alteration of the
55
56

458 U.S. at 88.
424 U.S. at 143–44.
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method of removal did not cure the problem with their
appointment and presented a constitutional problem of its own:
Arthrex argued that it is inconsistent with due process to entrust
determination of the validity of patents to an adjudicator who
does not enjoy the independence traditionally expected for those
engaged in judicial functions.
The Supreme Court did not enter this fray, but instead took a
different tack, converting the APJs to inferior officers by
subjecting PTAB decisions to review by the Director. Arthrex
had argued against this remedy as well, insisting that the Court
should leave the cure to Congress as it had done in Buckley and
Marathon Pipeline. Arthrex pointed out that there were
numerous possible cures for the improper appointment of the
APJs, including legislation requiring presidential appointment,
stripping away removal restrictions, subjecting APJ decisions to
the Director’s review, or simply abolishing the whole process of
inter partes review. Congress, the legislative branch, was best
suited to make this determination.
The Chief Justice’s opinion for the Court in Seila Law provides
perhaps the most persuasive argument against the remedy
chosen in Arthrex. Recall that in Seila Law, the constitutional
infirmity was that the CFPB’s single director could be removed
only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”
12 U.S. C. §§ 5491(c)(1), (3). The defenders of the statute urged
the Court to avoid striking it down. They urged the Court to
construe “neglect of duty” as allowing the President to remove
the CFPB director over policy disagreement. That construction
would have preserved the President’s authority over the
operations of the Executive Branch without invalidating the law.
The Court rejected this suggestion, pointedly observing that
“[c]onstitutional avoidance is not a license to rewrite Congress's
work to say whatever the Constitution needs it to say in a given
situation.” 57 Rather, the Chief Justice insisted that any
interpretation it might adopt to avoid unconstitutionality must
be “rooted in the statutory text and structure.” 58 Finding no
plausible construction of the CFBP’s removal provision that
would allow the President to remove the director over policy
57
58

Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2207.
Id.

20

Interpretation, Remedies, and the Rule of Law

[June

disagreement, the Court felt obligated to strike it down. This
resulted in unlimited presidential removal power of the CFBP
Director, a somewhat ironic outcome given the Court’s partial
reliance on Congress’s intent to create an independent CFPB as
a reason for rejecting the proffered limiting construction. 59
For present purposes, the question is whether the remedy in
Arthrex, construing the governing statute to allow the Director
to review PTAB decisions, amounts to a re-write of Congress’s
work. Arguably, the Chief Justice’s observation in Seila Law does
not apply because, in Arthrex, the Court was not engaged in
constitutional avoidance of the usual sort. It did not adopt a
saving construction of the statute governing PTAB review.
Rather, it struck down the provisions of the statute governing
inter partes review that prevented the Director from reviewing
PTAB decisions. But technicalities aside, the linguistic and
structural surgery that the Court performed on the statute at
issue in Arthrex seems equivalent to the sort of creative
construction it rejected in Seila Law because,in short, there was
no possible reading of the statute governing PTAB review that
granted the Director the review power that the Court ultimately
constructed. To understand this point, we need to examine
closely the statutory provisions at issue.
No statutory provision explicitly prohibits the Director from
reviewing PTAB decisions. Rather, that understanding results
from considering the absence of a provision granting the
Director a power of review together with the operation of other
provisions of the governing statute. These provisions include 35
U.S.C. § 6(b)(4), which assigns authority to conduct inter partes
review to the PTAB, and § 6(c), which specifies that each inter
partes review must be heard by at least three members of PTAB
(designated by the Director) and that only the PTAB itself
(consisting of hundreds of APJs and a handful of administrators)
may grant rehearings.60 While other provisions empower the
59 Id. at 2206–07 (“Neither Amicus nor the House explains how the CFPB
would be ‘independent’ if its head were required to implement the President’s
policies upon pain of removal.”). See also discussion infra, text at nn. 84–101
(discussing reliance on legislative intentions as a mode of statutory
interpretation).
60 The Court notes that government argued that rehearing petitions may be
acted upon by a panel chosen by the Director rather than by the entire PTAB,
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Director to issue binding rules and designate particular PTAB
decisions as precedential,61 they do not empower the Director to
review individual PTAB decisions. The result is that, under the
law’s terms, actual review of PTAB decisions is available in the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 62 and nowhere else,
rendering PTAB decisions the Executive Branch’s final word on
patent validity in cases that come before it.
The creativity of the Court’s remedy in Arthrex is revealed
most clearly by the fact that the Court did not identify any
specific statutory provision it was striking down but rather
effectively added provisions to the statutory scheme. While the
Court stated that “Section 6(c) cannot constitutionally be
enforced to the extent that its requirements prevent the Director
from reviewing final decisions rendered by APJs,” every
provision of § 6(c) remains operative after the Arthrex decision:
inter partes review is still conducted by a panel of at least three
PTAB members chosen by the Director, and PTAB may still
grant rehearings. The Court’s remedy does not require
removing any statutory language unless review by the Director
is necessarily considered a “rehearing.”63 Rather than excising
and that this provides a mechanism for the Director to review PTAB decisions.
141 S. Ct. at 1981. We are not sure of the correctness of either the government’s
interpretation of the legal provision at issue or the Court’s rejection of the
argument that this interpretation establishes a means of Director review
sufficient to conclude that the APJs were inferior officers, hence properly
appointed prior to Arthrex. We observe, however, that this interpretation
would have been a less radical solution than the Court’s creation of Director
review in the absence of suitable statutory text. See infra, text at nn. 63–65.
61 35 U.S.C. §§ 3(a)(2)(A), 316(a)(4).
62 35 U.S.C. § 319.
63 Section 6(c) provides that “Only the Patent Trial and Appeal Board may
grant rehearings.” Perhaps after Arthrex the Director may also grant
rehearings, but we do not believe that review by the Director would constitute
a rehearing. Ordinarily, review by a supervisory authority within an agency is
not denominated as a “rehearing”—as usually there is no additional
presentation of evidence, apart from written objections to the decision based
on the hearing already held. As of April 22, 2022, there have been
approximately 188 requests for Director review, and it appears that the process
involves written submission of legal arguments, not new presentation of
evidence. The Director granted review to only three of those 188 requests. All
three involved claims by a patent owner that the panel’s decision was
inconsistent with a Federal Circuit decision on another patent. In all three
cases, the Director remanded the case to the PTAB for reconsideration. Review
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language from the statue as unconstitutional, the remedy chosen
in Arthrex required the effective addition of a provision granting
the Director power to review PTAB decisions. This need not
necessarily include the power to grant rehearings, although the
Court’s decision is not clear on this point. The decision, thus,
may or may not have been intended to remove the word “only”
from § 6(c).
This remedy is unusual (perhaps unprecedented) and plainly
in tension with the Court’s observation in Seila Law that
“constitutional avoidance is not a license to rewrite” statutes.64
The Seila Law observation is based on the Constitution’s
allocation of the lawmaking function to Congress, not the courts.
Prior cases in which the method of appointing an officer was
determined to be unconstitutional disabled the improperly
appointed official from carrying out the functions beyond that
official’s constitutional remit. In removal cases, the Court’s
remedy of invalidating a removal restriction while leaving the
remainder of the statute in place might be considered to stretch
the judiciary’s power more, as it results in an agency structure
different from the one Congress established. But in no case we
know of other than Arthrex has the Court enhanced the power of
an appointed officer by effectively adding a provision to a
statutory scheme to cure a constitutional defect.65
The closest analogue may be the Court’s remedy in Buckley,
which allowed the FEC commissioners to continue to perform
non-executive tasks such as maintaining information and
performing research for Congress. Preserving officials’ power to
perform those constitutionally permissible functions when they
were not properly appointed to take executive actions, however,
is a far cry from increasing the power of an official in order to
preserve the operation of an executive function. It is possible
was denied or dismissed in 174 cases and is pending in eleven more. See
https://www.uspto.gov/patents/patent-trial-and-appeal-board/statusdirector-review-requests.
64 Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2207.
65 Excision of a removal restriction enhances the power of the President, or
in some cases a principal officer, but that is the result of the excision of an
unconstitutional statutory provision, not the addition of a provision enhancing
anyone’s power. See, e.g., Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. 477 (enhancing the
power of the SEC to remove PCAOB members); Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. 2183
(enhancing the power of the President to remove the director of the CFPB).
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that Congress would not have committed those powers to the
FEC in the absence of authority to take actions that only can be
granted to properly appointed Officers of the United States, but
that is hardly obvious, nor is it clear what constitutional harm is
done by this aspect of the Buckley Court’s statutory construction.
This brings us back to the question, why didn’t the Arthrex
Court accept the Federal Circuit’s approach and make the APJs
removable at will by the Director? Although the Court did not
explain why it rejected that solution, there are two reasons that
this approach might have been a less attractive option.
First, it is not clear whether at-will removal status would be
sufficient to convert the APJs into inferior officers. Cabinet
Secretaries and other high-ranking officers are removable at
will, and yet nearly all of these officers undoubtedly are
principal officers. Further, even if it had accepted the excision of
protections against removal of APJs at will, the Court still would
have had to deal with the fact that, once rendered, PTAB
decisions were unreviewable within the Executive Branch. The
Court majority simply may have disagreed with the Federal
Circuit’s view that at-will removal was sufficient to remedy the
constitutional defect respecting PTAB decisions. At least, the
majority may have had serious enough doubts about the matter
to prefer Director review, which overcomes the primary
objection to APJs’ possible principal officer status.
Second, subjecting an adjudicator to at-will removal raises
concerns of its own. It might be viewed as a threat to due process
or at least as an undesirable diminution of the APJs
independence.66 For similar reasons, the Court has not decided
whether its ban on two levels of for-cause insulation from
presidential removal applies to restrictions on removal of
Administrative Law judges.67 The majority of justices may have
found their approach to construing the law in Arthrex preferable
to becoming entangled in the thicket implicit in at-will removal
of adjudicators.

66 We view the due process problem as a red herring, or at least a deep pink
one, but the question of the exact scope of authority for first-level
administrative adjudicators is, as a matter of policy, a serious one.
67 See PCAOB, 561 U.S. at 507 n. 10.
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There is, of course, more than one way to avoid that thicket.
Our question, then, becomes why the Court found its statutory
surgery—creating authority for superior-officer review—more
supportable than simply holding the appointments of the APJs
unconstitutional and prohibiting them from adjudicating inter
partes cases (or taking any other unsupervised actions within
their statutory jurisdiction). The Court did not comment on why
it rejected the second possibility, but we are left with a sense that
the Arthrex majority was trying to minimize the disruption
inherent in its enforcement of this feature of constitutional
separation of powers.68
There are other examples of this inclination, for instance in the
Court’s King v. Burwell opinion preserving the Affordable Care
Act’s system of subsidies for purchasing health insurance.69 That
result was reached through what on its face appears to be a feat
of counter-textual statutory interpretation. 70 In support of the
Court’s creative reading of the Affordable Care Act, Chief Justice
Roberts noted that “in every case we must respect the role of the
Legislature, and take care not to undo what it has done. A fair
reading of legislation demands a fair understanding of the
legislative plan.”71 In other words, the Chief Justice’s position
seems to be that the Court should partner with Congress and
facilitate, not frustrate, the achievement of Congress’s legislative
goals (as the justices’ see them—a caveat of major proportions,
as it turns out).
68 For a description of different methods of minimizing disruption of
legislative schemes, along with one view of the relation of different methods
to alternative theories of judicial avoidance of conflicts with the other branches,
see Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945 (1997). Readers
should note that the approach taken here differs from Professor Vermeule’s
view respecting the relationship between severability and respect for
legislative (majoritarian) “supremacy” over matters within the scope of
Congress’s power. Where he views “vigorous severability” as “deferential to
legislative policies,” id. at 1946–47, we see that approach as potentially invasive
of the legislature’s domain absent clear statutory directives regarding what
should be treated as severable. See discussion infra, text at nn. 72–101.
69 See King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 489–98 (2015) (“construing” a provision
providing subsidies to purchases of health insurance through “an Exchange
established by the State” to include an exchange established by the federal
government.) See discussion infra, text at nn. 87–88.
70 King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. at 489–98.
71 King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. at 498.
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One can take a similar view of the Court’s employment of the
severability doctrine in removal cases and in other separationof-powers cases such as Chadha. Rather than sever the offensive
provisions, the Court could shut down entire programs, for
example by holding that that no more suspensions of
deportation may occur until Congress amends the statute to
remove the legislative veto (and perhaps provide an alternative
method of congressional supervision) or that the CFPB cannot
continue to operate until Congress establishes a constitutional
structure for it. On this view, by not choosing more draconian
remedies, the Court cooperates with Congress by preserving, as
much as possible, the integrity of the federal programs Congress
has designed and provided for by law.
Hence, concerns about minimizing judicial interference with
the operation of important federal statutes, implicit in other
cases, also may explain an approach that limits disruption to
inter partes review. While not as visible to most people as the
arguments for adopting the ACA, the establishment of inter
partes review responded to widespread complaints that grants
of large numbers of dubious patents were interfering with
innovation and harming the economy more generally. 72 The
Court struggled to preserve as much of the inter partes system

72 For general criticisms of the U.S. patent system that sparked the push for
many of the reforms embodied in the American Invents Act, see JAMES BESSEN
& MICHAEL MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS PUT
INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008). The AIA did not solve—and almost inevitably
could not (or should not) solve—what Bessen and Meurer saw as the biggest
problem, the inability of innovators to figure out in advance whether what they
are working on is already covered by a patent. For one view on this, see Rob
Wheeler & James Allworth, U.S. Patent Overhaul Won’t Help Innovators, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Sep. 15, 2011), available at https://hbr.org/2011/09/the-americainvents-act-rearra. For divergent views of the patent system, raising some
critical points but mostly more supportive of its functioning and more in line
with limits on the changes to it, see Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208 (2014); RONALD A. CASS & KEITH N. HYLTON, LAWS OF CREATION:
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WORLD OF IDEAS ch. 5 (Harv. Univ. Press 2013); John R.
Allison & Ronald J. Mann, The Disputed Quality of Software Patents, 85 WASH.
U.L. REV. 297, 334 (2007); Ronald A. Cass, Lessons from the Smartphone Wars:
Patent Litigants, Patent Quality, and Software, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 52–56
(2015).
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as possible just as it struggled to preserve the ACA from
statutory and constitutional difficulties.73
Is this the right approach for courts to adopt in fashioning
remedies for violations of constitutional provisions rooted in the
separation of powers, or should the Court impose more
disruptive remedies when those better address a statute’s
infirmities? Should the Court have invalidated the entire system
of inter partes review in Arthrex or narrowed the scope of health
insurance subsidies in King v. Burwell? Is the inclination to search
for ways of reconstituting statutes to save them a product of the
times in which, due to polarization and gridlock, it appears far
less likely that Congress will cure constitutional problems,
allowing important federal interests to go unaddressed? Or is
the Court simply concerned with making it easier for the
nation’s governance system to take the medicine of stricter
enforcement of separation of powers, perhaps out of worry over
its own political capital? We turn next to the subject of these
questions: the constitutional propriety and consequences of
remedial choices.
IV.

JUDICIAL ROLE: STATUTORY REVISION VERSUS
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

The Court’s remedies in Arthrex, King v. Burwell, and similar
cases raise questions both of institutional role and of pragmatic
effects. First, by revising statutory provisions, even when the
goal is to save as much as possible of Congress’s work product,
the Court may be taking on an inappropriately legislative role.74
This role may require reliance on skills that are not within the
judiciary’s special expertise and reach questions not properly
framed for judicial disposition. In fact, regardless of the ultimate
propriety of the practice, divining legislative intent in order to
justify constructive remedial action seems out of step with the
textualist interpretive methodology that characterizes
contemporary statutory analysis at the Court. Second, in
73 See NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (upholding Congress’s power to
impose a tax on the failure to purchase health insurance despite Congress’s
declaration that the payment was not a tax).
74 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 72, 97–
98 (1995) (Ashwander).
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reconstituting laws to avoid excessive disruption of statutory
schemes, the Court may produce both unintended and
unfortunate practical results.
A. Separating Functions of Court and Congress
Our first concern is whether the sort of statutory
reconstruction illustrated by Arthrex is an appropriate project for
courts or, instead, falls within the legislature’s domain. The
overarching question is whether the court in Arthrex or King v.
Burwell is impinging on the exercise of power committed to a
coordinate branch. This concern presents two distinct but
related questions respecting, first, the skill set that is required for
what the Court does and, second, the manner in which the
question to be resolved comes to the Court.
(1) Interpretation vs. Intuition: Judicial or Extra-Judicial Skills
The first question is one of judicial capacity. Justice Antonin
Scalia defended interpretive approaches that elevate attention to
legal texts, as opposed to the purposes behind them, in
significant measure as more congruent with judges’ skills. 75
Judges can read legal documents and say what the words
mean.76 They can employ numerous canons of construction to
determine what is the best reading of the law. And while some
scholars have made fun of these canons as contradictory and
spongy nostrums,77 others have explained how the canons can
aid decision-making and advance rule-of-law values. 78 Judges
See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in ANTONIN
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 25–47
(Amy Guttman ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1997) (Interpretation) (articulating the
benefits of certain approaches to interpretation that can be described as
“lawyers’ work, id. at 46); John Manning, Justice Scalia and the Idea of Judicial
Restraint, 115 MICH. L. REV. 747 (2017).
76 See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347 (2005).
77 See, e.g., KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING
APPEALS 521–35 (Little, Brown & Co. 1960); Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the
Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about How Statutes Are to Be
Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950).
78 See, e.g., Anita S. Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons, 84 U.
CHI. L. REV. 825 (2017) (marshaling evidence that the canons are more useful
and less self-contradictory than Llewellyn claimed); Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction and Judicial Preferences,
75
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also can say what the ordinary meaning of a word or phrase was
at the time a text was adopted as law. The skills needed for such
determinations are those in which judges are trained, though, to
be fair, some element of historiography that is not entirely
within judges’ training surely is helpful in the second task.79
The more judges and justices focus on the task of reading
law—of looking to texts and trying to understand their meaning
based on the texts’ words and context—the more likely they are
to be utilizing skills common to lawyers and to be constrained
in what they do. That was Justice Scalia’s principal argument for
textualism based in publicly understood meaning.80 One doesn’t
have to fully embrace Scalia’s approach to textualism—or any
specific version of it—to appreciate the point that construing text
based on the meaning of the words and their use in context has
a constraining effect.81 Justice Elena Kagan, while not committed
to Scalia’s textualism, made that point in declaring “we are all
textualists now.” 82 Further, the degree of agreement among
45 VAND. L. REV. 647 (1992) (explaining how the canons are used and how they
may prove helpful, even if Llewellyn’s critique is largely correct in respect of
the determinacy of the entire body of constructive canons). See also ANTONIN
SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS
69–339 (Thomson/West 2012) (cataloguing and explaining a wide array of
different canons, both individually and by categories).
79 See, e.g., Matthew J. Festa, Applying a Useable Past: The Use of History in Law,
38 SETON HALL L. REV. 479 (2008); Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit
Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. L. REV. 119 (1965).
80 See Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 75; Ronald A. Cass, Administrative Law
in Nino’s Wake: The Scalia Effect on Method and Doctrine, 32 J.L. & POL. 277, 279–
80 (2017); Manning, supra note 75; Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION, supra note 75, at 129–49.
81 For discussions of various versions of textualism and originalism,
including some anchored in authorial intentions, see for example Larry
Alexander, Originalism, the Why and the What, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 539 (2013);
John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Unifying Original Intent and Original
Public Meaning, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1371 (2019); Stephen B. Presser, Should the
“Hollow Core” of Constitutional Theory Be Filled with the Framers’ Intentions?, 22
FED. SOC. REV. 210 (2021) (reviewing DONALD L. DRAKEMAN, THE HOLLOW CORE
OF CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY WE NEED THE FRAMERS (Cambridge Univ.
Press 2021).
82 See Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Why (And When)
Judges Dissent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 101, 106
& n. 9 (reporting a dissent rate in the U.S. Courts of Appeals of 2.6% in all
decisions and 7.8% in published decisions from 1990 to 2007 and 62% in the
same period at the Supreme Court). Despite a far larger proportion of non-
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judges and justices—over ninety percent on the U.S. courts of
appeals and the most common outcome even at the Supreme
Court—underscores the impact of a common skill in reading law
and a broad commitment to law-bound judging.83
Different approaches to remedies for unconstitutionality draw
on different skills, some within judges’ core competence and
some decidedly outside. Deciding whether a specific provision
can be excised from a statute consistent with the terms of the law
itself draws on basic skills of statutory construction. At least for
a fairly substantial set of cases, it does not require judges to go
beyond the ordinary bases for interpreting texts. If there is a
provision on severability, the question for the Court is simply,
unanimous decisions at the Supreme Court, year after year, unanimity is the
most common outcome at the Court, even though it does not represent more
than half of all outcomes. For example, in the Supreme Court’s October 2020
Term, more decisions were unanimous (forty-three percent) than any other
vote distribution. The second most common vote distributions were 6-3 and 53 (due to recusals), together making up twenty-four percent of decisions—just
slightly more than half as large a share of the Court’s decisions as the share of
unanimous decisions. In contrast, although getting a large amount of attention,
only twelve percent of the Court’s decisions were made by a vote of 5-4. See
https://www.scotusblog.com/statistics/. For a general discussion of the
dynamics of consensus and dissent on the United States Courts of Appeals, see
VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER, STEFANIE A. LUNDQUIST & WENDY L. MARTINEK, JUDGING
ON A COLLEGIAL COURT: INFLUENCES ON FEDERAL APPELLATE DECISION MAKING
(Univ. of Virginia Press 2006).
83 See STEPHEN G. BREYER, THE AUTHORITY OF THE COURT AND THE PERIL OF
POLITICS 34–36 (Harv. Univ. Press 2021); RONALD A. CASS, THE RULE OF LAW IN
AMERICA 35–45, 72–97, 150–51 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 2001); The District
of Columbia Circuit: The Importance of Balance on the Nation’s Second Highest Court:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm.
On the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 45–54 (2002) (statement of Ronald A. Cass, Dean
of Boston University School of Law) (noting unanimity of results in more than
98 percent of decisions from the D.C. Circuit, a court often described as
deciding highly politicized cases and reflecting political influence on the
judiciary); Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C.
Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1358–60 (1998) (providing a similar argument based
on experience as a member of that court).
To be sure, not all judges and justices agree on the best approach to weighing
different inputs to interpretation of law—including the best way of reading
texts, see, e.g., Tara Leigh Grove, Which Textualism?, 134 HARV. L. REV. 265
(2020). Nonetheless, the judges’ and justices’ commitment to basing decisions
on extrinsic authority, including the increased reliance on anchoring decisions
in the text of governing authority referenced by Justice Kagan, is an essential
attribute for consensus on the courts, including the Supreme Court.
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what does the provision say is severable? Does it allow the
excision of the provision that has been found to be
unconstitutional? If so, the Court should declare the
constitutionally defective part of the law unenforceable and then
decide how much of the work of the agency can proceed under
what remains of the law. Each of these steps draws on traditional
judicial skills in service of a traditional judicial function.
Deciding whether Congress would have wanted a law to be
kept without the excised provision, however, is a very different
task calling on very different skills. 84 The difference between
reading the law’s text and attempting to construct what might
have been desired but not explicitly said is that, for the latter
approach, judges must identify a purpose underlying the law
from which to infer more determinate meaning.85 The asserted
futility of this endeavor has been a driving force in the move
toward textualist statutory interpretation. That is why, in our
view, the remedies in Arthrex and King v. Burwell are in tension
with the current dominant textualist methodology at the Court. 86
This purpose-based approach was the route taken quite
boldly in King v. Burwell, where the majority divined the major
purposes behind the ACA, decided that those purposes would
be frustrated by reading the text of the law to mean what it
clearly said, and then construed the law in a manner that is at
odds with the text adopted by Congress.87 The result was that a
law granting tax subsidies to purchases of health insurance
Although it might seem that this observation applies only in the absence
of a severability clause, it actually applies more broadly for two reasons. First,
while in our view this is often misguided for reasons discussed above, the
Court’s decisions applying severability clauses still ask whether Congress
would have enacted the remaining provisions had it known which particular
provisions would be struck down. Second, when the Court constructs a new
provision, as it did in Arthrex, rather than simply excise defective features of a
statute, it explains its action in light of likely congressional intent.
85 See Antonin Scalia & John F. Manning, A Dialogue on Statutory and
Constitutional Interpretation, 80 GEO. WASH. U.L. REV. 1610, 1612 (2012).
86 See Michael D. Shumsky, supra note 52. One of us is not convinced of the
merit of textualist statutory interpretation methodologies and is not troubled
by judicial creativity in statutory construction designed to further Congress’s
overriding purposes. See Jack M. Beermann, The Turn Toward Congress in
Administrative Law, 89 B.U. L. REV. 727 (2009).
87 See King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. at 493-97.
84
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through a specific mechanism under a specific section of law
was construed to grant those subsidies to purchases through a
different mechanism under a completely separate section of the
law. 88 The end result was that the law itself was rewritten to
reflect the purpose that the majority of justices found motivated
the law.
The approach of King v. Burwell is akin to saying that Tom
went to the grocery store to buy dinner, so he must have wanted
to purchase meat (or tofu) (commonly understood as a central
element of a fulfilling dinner and something Tom had once said
he liked). Under this approach, the fact that Tom didn’t actually
purchase meat (or tofu) is subordinated to the understanding
that he must have wanted to, given the judicially identified
purpose of his trip.89
The obvious problem is that constructing the purpose of
legislation—like constructing the purpose of Tom’s trip to the
store—requires intuiting the preferences of the critical actors. In
the case of legislation, that means the preferences of the majority
of Representatives and Senators voting for a statute (and,
presumably, the President who signs it). Construing actors’
intentions at times is required for legal judgments, as occurs
regularly when juries determine whether an actor intended to
harm the person he shot or, instead, shot the victim
unintentionally. 90 Yet, the required construction of intentions
behind legislation is a much more difficult task.
Despite recent arguments to the contrary,91 Congress is not an
entity with a single, unified, corporate intention in enacting
88 See id., at 489-90 (reading “established by the State under Section 1311” to
include exchanges established by the federal government under section 1321)
(emphasis added).
89 One of us is a vegetarian, or more accurately a pesce-dairy-eggatarian.
Tofu references as a substitute for meat should be understood as a personal
accommodation to dietary differences between the authors.
90 See generally Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV
463 (1992) (discussing range of mental states that lead to culpability in criminal
law and liability in tort law).
91 See Ryan D. Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress Really Works?, 66 DUKE L.J.
979 (2017); Brian D. Feinstein, Congress Is an It, available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4031134&dgcid=ejournal
_htmlemail_u.s.:constitutional:law:interpretation:judicial:review:ejournal_abs
tractlink.
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legislation. 92 Individual members of Congress vote for
legislation for a variety of reasons, and the purposes ascribed to
the legislation by its most vocal champions may not at all
describe the purposes of the majority much less the purposes of
the member whose vote determined whether the law passed or
failed.93 These divergent intentions do not necessarily contradict
a shared understanding of what the law—or, more to the point,
a given provision in the law—is supposed to accomplish. But,
apart from the text of the law itself, the materials commonly
available to support inferences about the understood purpose of
the law have deficiencies as guides, not least because they are
often intended by specific individuals to serve as guides for
judicial construction of the law.94
In addition, materials of “legislative history” do not always
precede legislation, further compromising their reliability as
evidence of understood purposes. 95 Although materials
respecting modern legislation tend to be much more plentiful
than materials respecting the adoption of constitutional text,
they are far more likely to have been generated with an eye to
biasing subsequent judicial interpretations. 96 Ultimately,
parsing the evidence respecting legislators’ understanding of
the purposes of a particular law and then drawing inferences
about those purposes’ effect on the meaning of a specific point

92 Although many scholars have made this point over the past 60 years, the
pithiest and most noted exposition is Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,”
Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992).
93 For discussion of the operation of Congress and strategic behavior in
political positioning, as well as the importance of the median voter’s
preferences in determining legislative outcomes, see DAVID R. MAYHEW,
CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (Yale Univ. Press 1974); KENNETH A.
SHEPSLE & MARK S. BONCHEK, ANALYZING POLITICS: RATIONALITY, BEHAVIOR,
AND INSTITUTIONS 115-19, 142-57 (W.W. Norton 1997).
94 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 61 (1994) (Text, History); Scalia &
Manning, supra note 85, at 1612.
95 See Clarke v. Securities Indus. Assn., 479 U.S. 388, 407 (1987); Kenneth W.
Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, DUKE L.J. 371, 377 (1987).
96 See Scalia & Manning, supra note 85, at 1612 (“Downtown Washington law
firms make it their business to create legislative history.”)
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of interpretation requires information difficult to unearth and
skills that lie outside the judicial domain.97
Our aim here is not to score a point for the anti-legislativehistory side of the interpretive debate. 98 Instead, our purpose
here—and with only two authors it should be far easier than
with 537 lawmakers99 to accept the stated purpose as real—is to
underscore the difficulty of evaluating what lawmakers would
have wanted to do with laws in the absence of a clear declaration
respecting severance. Would those who passed the law have
preferred a truncated version of the law, with a given provision
excised, or no law? How do judges know?
97 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statute’s Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547-48
(1983). This is especially true as the federal judiciary, including the Supreme
Court, increasingly is composed of members who have been judges at other
levels, professors, lawyers, and executive officials, but who have not been
legislators or served in elective office. Consider, for example, that the current
Supreme Court (at the time of this writing) includes eight justices who
previously served on a U.S. Court of Appeals, eight who had served in the
Executive Branch, three who had been full-time law professors, and none who
had held elective office.
98 Among the entries into this debate, see for example STEPHEN BREYER,
AMERICA’S SUPREME COURT: MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK 98–102 (Oxford. Univ.
Press 2010); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 61 (1991); Lisa Schutz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck,
Statutory Interpretation from the Inside: An Empirical Study of Congressional
Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013); Part II,
66 STAN. L. REV. 725 (2014) (marshaling evidence that those who are most
involved in the law-drafting process generally see their efforts reflected in the
committee reports that compose the most-referenced parts of legislative
history); Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting
Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992); Easterbrook, Text, History, supra note 94;
Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 CHI-KENT L.
REV 441 (1990); McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory
in Statutory Interpretation, 57 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 26 (1994); Scalia,
Interpretation, supra note 75, at 16–23, 29–37; Scalia & Manning, supra note 85;
Starr, supra note 95. The authors differ on their skepticism of legislative history
(Beermann, less; Cass, more), but agree that it is not likely to answer precise
questions about what would have occurred had legislators known the
likelihood of judicial invalidation of a particular provision. See also text and
note 148, infra.
99 We are not miscounting members of the Senate and House of
Representatives; instead, we are including the Vice-President, whose vote
breaks ties in the Senate and the President, who may sign legislation or veto it
and consequently has considerable influence in shaping important legislation,
as a lawmaker.
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This point is apposite to the remedial issue in Arthrex, even
though the decision there is more easily justified as consistent
with the law as enacted than the decision in King v. Burwell. After
all, the law respecting APJs generally treats them as officers not
intended to have broad, final decisional authority for their
employing agency. 100 But we must add an “except” to this
conclusion: that is, except for the fact that no provision was made
in the law for review of APJs’ inter partes decisions. In fact, no
plausible reading of the text even suggests that the Director has
authority to review the APJs’ decisions. The opinions in Arthrex
do not resolve whether insulation of APJs’ decisions supports
larger purposes for the America Invents Act or other provisions
of patent law, focusing more on the nature of APJs’ authority
and their place in the Commerce department’s hierarchy rather
than on broader aspects of the law. The remedy adopted,
however, required judicial creation of a new authority—intra
agency review—not present in the law prior to the Arthrex
decision, offering the possibility that it advanced one purpose of
the law while potentially undercutting other purposes.
Further, saying that the Arthrex Court’s remedy most likely fit
the overall design of the law, thus helping achieve its
understood purposes, is not the same as saying that the decision
followed from interpreting the law on the basis of texts that
arguably should govern the justices’ decisions. Even where the
justices’ construction of purposes for lawmaking is not
controversial and where a remedy seems to advance those
purposes, the Court should not be in the position of rewriting a
law to make it constitutional.
Obviously, the Court would not appropriately be asked to
serve as a Council of Revision to oversee and improve legislation
(especially its constitutionality) prior to its enactment, a role
considered and rejected by the Constitutional Convention.101 If,
having found that the sort of rewriting needed to make a
challenged provision constitutional is the wrong task for a
judicial body when the law is being framed, the Court should
See Arthrex, 141 S. Ct. at 2000 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Jack Rakove, Judicial Power in the Constitutional Theory of James Madison, 43
WM. & MARY L. REV 1513, 1517-23 (2002); James T. Barry III, Comment: The
Council of Revision and the Limits of Judicial Power, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 248-57
(1989).
100
101
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not presume to exercise a similar revisory authority at secondhand. That is, if the Court is not to be a Commission of Revision
as a general matter, it should not become one after passing
judgment on a specific provision of the law. That, however, is
the function the Court exercises when, as in Arthrex, it reframes
a law to make it constitutional after opining on how the
Congress would have written the law if it had known what the
decision on constitutionality with respect to a given provision
would be.
(2) Deciding Cases: Advice or Adjudication
Another set of reservations about the approach taken in
Arthrex is rooted in considerations respecting the basis for
judicial power to declare laws unconstitutional. The classic,
widely accepted, explanation for judicial review authority is
Chief Justice John Marshall’s statement in Marbury v. Madison:
[T]hose who have framed written Constitutions
contemplate them as forming the fundamental and
paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of
every such government must be that an act of the Legislature
repugnant to the Constitution is void....
It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial
Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule
to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret
that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Courts must
decide on the operation of each.102

Marshall’s reasoning is a simple, three-part syllogism. Courts
are called upon when deciding cases to interpret the legal rules
that govern the case at hand. Interpreting and applying rules
includes determining when legal rules conflict. And when a
statute-based rule conflicts with a constitution-based rule, the
constitutional rule must prevail. Marbury asserts that the
inherent nature of a written constitution is that its rules are a
species of law, hence, courts must interpret them and apply
them in the same way they would other laws, but constitutional
law trumps congressional law.103

102
103

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (Marbury).
Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176–79.
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Anchoring judicial review in courts’ obligation to “say what
the law is” in order to decide cases, as Marbury does, suggests
limits to when and how federal courts properly exercise their
review authority. Most obvious, the case that requires a court to
say what the law is must be properly before the court as a case. If
litigants are free to come to court simply to ask for judges’ view
on the law’s meaning and constitutionality, courts are not
answering those questions to decide a case; they are answering
them to satisfy litigants’ desires—and perhaps their own—for
judges to shape future debates.
Put differently, if legal rights are not determined, the dispute
being resolved is not a case in law. Instead, the dispute in effect
is merely a request for an advisory opinion or is being treated by
the courts as if it were just that. Openness to such a use of the
courts is at odds with the Constitution. That document
specifically authorizes the President to request opinions of his
Department Heads,104 but there is no similar provision for the
President or anyone else to request advisory opinions from the
courts. This has long been understood as a basis for rejecting the
power of judges to render such opinions.105
This has also been the basis for rejecting litigation by
individuals who have nothing significant to gain from it—at
least, nothing that would distinguish the individuals seeking to
invoke judicial process from the mass of fellow citizens. The
Supreme Court made that reasoning clear 80 years ago in
Massachusetts v. Mellon, underscoring the need for a litigant to
have a significant personal stake in a controversy apart from
mere philosophical interest in a point of legal construction.106 In
the Court’s words, failing to observe this requirement would
have courts acting “not to decide a judicial controversy, but to
assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of
another and coequal department, an authority which plainly we

U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
See William Casto, The Early Supreme Court Justices’ Most Significant
Opinion, 29 OHIO NORTHERN L. REV. 174, 189 (2002) (discussing Letter from
Justices of the Supreme Court to George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793), reprinted
in 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 17891800 app., at 743–58 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds., 1998)).
106 262 U.S. 447, 487–89 (1923).
104
105
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do not possess.”107 Similarly, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the
Court emphasized requirements that plaintiffs assert a
distinctive, concrete injury-in-fact and identify a remedy that
would alleviate, ameliorate, or compensate for the injury.108
One of the most acute observers of early American life and
institutions, Alexis de Tocqueville, applauded our limitations on
when courts can pass on the meaning and constitutionality of
statutes.109 The critical feature that permits judges in America the
“judicial authority … [is] carefully restricted … to the ordinary
circle of its functions.”110 De Tocqueville explained that letting
courts pronounce broadly on the validity of legislation outside
the narrow context where it is necessary to resolve a case
inevitably invites judges to “play[] a prominent part in the
political sphere.” 111 But if the judge is called on to decide
whether a law can apply in the case at hand, that reduces both
the visibility and the political entwinement of the decision. 112
These observations reprise arguments advanced by Alexander

Id., at 489.
504 U.S. 555, 560–62 (1992). Justice Scalia wrote for the Court—though
only for a plurality with respect to redressability—in laying out the general
requirements for standing and their result in the case. We note, however, that
the concurring and dissenting justices demurred from the plurality discussion
of redressability either because they deemed it unnecessary to reach that issue
given the facts of the case or because they viewed the facts as sufficient to make
a prima facie case of redressability, rather than because they disagreed with
the essence of the concept of redressability as part of standing.
Although Justice Scalia’s tripartite analysis has become the dominant
understanding of the law of standing, it was greeted at the time with
skepticism from commentators who saw it as a “transformation in the law of
standing” and “difficult to square with the language and history of Article III.”
Gene R. Nichol Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE L.
J. 1141, 1142-43 (1993). See also Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan?
Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 166 (1992)
(“Lujan's invalidation of a congressional grant of standing is a
misinterpretation of the Constitution. . . . It has no support in the text or history
of Article III. It is essentially an invention of federal judges, and recent ones at
that.”).
109 See 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 100–06 (Henry
Reeve trans., Schocken Books 1961) (1835).
110 Id., at 101.
111 Id., at 105.
112 Id., at 103–06.
107
108
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Hamilton in Federalist 78, 113 but from the perspective of an
observer rather than a participant in framing the powers and
limits of each branch.
The argument for pronouncing on constitutional questions as
a matter of ordinary law and necessity to the disposition of a
case only permits such decisions when they are essential to the
disposition of the case. Hence, in Arthrex, announcing that APJs
finally decide patent issues in inter partes review in violation of
the Constitution would require the Court to hold the PTAB’s
decision of Arthrex’s case invalid. Without that remedy, the
Court has made a free-standing constitutional determination
that in essence constitutes an advisory opinion.114 This is not a
function given to the federal courts or a proper exercise of
Article III power.
B. Pragmatic Effects on Congress and Courts
Despite the tension between the Arthrex Court’s approach to
remedy and the considerations discussed above respecting
judges’ skills and courts’ constitutionally assigned role, another
set of arguments over best behavior for courts might offer some
support the plurality’s decision. These arguments revolve
around the pragmatic effects of judicial decisions and reasons
judges might temper their decisional inclinations out of regard
for them. We examine these below, although we do not find
them suitable defenses for Arthrex, nor in large degree
convincing templates for the wider run of cases.
(1) Bickel’s “Passive Virtues”
There has been debate for almost a century over the Supreme
Court’s perceived turnabout on the scope of federal commerce
power in the 1930s. Some commentary lauds the change as “the
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
The unnecessary pronouncement on a legal issue that does not resolve
rights of litigants should be distinguished from a properly constructed
declaratory judgment, which can resolve rights of litigants in political entities’
boundary disputes, suits to quiet title, and similar cases seeking resolution of
legal rights. See Edwin M. Borchard, The Constitutionality of Declaratory
Judgments, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 561, 570, 594–600 (1931); David P. Currie,
Misunderstanding Standing, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 45–46 (1982); Abraham A.
Ribicoff, Note: The Constitutionality of the Declaratory Judgment, 1 U. CHI. L. REV.
132, 136 (1933).
113
114
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switch in time that saved nine,”115 assuming that Justice Owen
Roberts changed his vote in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish116 to
avoid reactions—including President Franklin Roosevelt’s
threatened Court-packing—to decisions striking down laws that
formed (or were in line with) Roosevelt’s New Deal. Others treat
the turnaround as an unprincipled capitulation to the politics of
the day.117
Whether Justice Roberts’ West Coast Hotel vote in fact was at
odds with his vote a year earlier in a similar case118 is contested,
as is the reason for his famous vote.119 Whatever the truth, the
widespread perception that Roberts’ vote responded at least in
part to concerns about consequences if the Supreme Court
continued swimming against the political tides of the day has
been grist for argument over judicial advertence to the political
impact of the Court’s decisions.120
The perils of judges’ tacking before the prevailing political
winds—that is, as those winds are perceived by the judges—
seem obvious and obviously at odds with the role of judges as
bulwarks of law in the face of political pressures. Giving judges
space to perform that role is the principal reason for insulating
See John Q. Barrett, Attribution Time: Cal Tinney's 1937 Quip, "A Switch in
Time'll Save Nine," 73 OKLA. L. REV. 229 (2021).
116 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
117 For a long list of commentators who view the “switch in time” as
capitulation to politics, see, e.g., Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court,
80 VA. L. REV. 201, 202 n. 1 (1994) (citing, inter alia, JOSEPH ALSOP & TURNER
CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS (1938), EDWARD S. CORWIN, COURT OVER
CONSTITUTION: A S TUDY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POPULAR
GOVERNMENT 121-28 (1950), and EDWARD S. CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION, LTD. 39-79 (1941).
118 Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
119 See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF
A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 5 (Oxford Univ. Press 1998); 2 BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 343 (Harv. Univ. Press 1998)
120 See, e.g., Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 201
(1994); Daniel E. Ho & Kevin Quinn, Did a Switch in Time Save Nine?, 2 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 69 (2010); William Leuchtenberg, When the People Spoke, What Did
They Say?: The Election of 1936 and the Ackerman Thesis, 80 YALE L. J. 2077 (1999);
G. Edward White, Cabining the Constitutional History of the New Deal in Time, 94
MICH. L. REV. 1392 (1996). See generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE
PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED
THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (Farrar, Straus & Giroux 2009).]
115
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federal judges with lifetime appointments and irreducible
pay. 121 Looking at potential political reactions to judicial
decisions—and, especially, changing positions on legal
interpretation to mute critical reactions—would seem to violate
the fundamental predicates of judicial independence and
principled decisionmaking, the supposed hallmarks of proper
judging and of the rule of law.122 Even if the judge’s departure
from what otherwise would seem the appropriate, principled
decision is predicated on concern for the Court as an institution,
that hardly justifies distorting the law. Changing course to avoid
a feared constitutional collision that would seriously diminish
the Court’s ability to play its role of neutral law interpreter
(where necessary to resolve legal disputes properly presented to
it) so fully undermines the Court’s legitimacy as to be akin to
killing the patient in order to save him.123 Further, doesn’t giving
in to perceived threats of punishment for unpopular decisions—
threats such as Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan or more recent
moves to expand and alter judicial personnel or jurisdiction124—
simply encourage further threats?125
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
See Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A Comment
on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964); Herbert
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles in Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1959). But see Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings,
Should Judges Care?, 60 STAN. L. REV. 155 (2007) (arguing that there are
legitimate reasons for judicial caution in swimming against the tide of public
concerns).
123 This essentially is Professor Gunther’s complaint about the avoidance
techniques championed by Professor Bickel. See discussion, infra, text at nn.
126–132.
124 See, e.g., William E. Leuchtenberg, FDR’s Court-Packing Plan: A Second Life,
a Second Death, 1985 DUKE L. J. 673 (1985); Jess Bravin, Democratic Lawmakers
Present Plan to Expand Supreme Court, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 2021, available at
https://www.wsj.com/articles/group-of-democratic-lawmakers-to-presentplan-to-expand-supreme-court-11618447336.
125 See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Property Rights Systems and the Rule of Law, in THE
ELGAR COMPANION TO THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 222, 227–30 (Enrico
Colombatto ed., Edward Elgar Pub. 2004) (describing the experience in
Zimbabwe, with President Robert Mugable altering the personnel of the
Supreme Court of Zimbabwe and having a case reheard after first ruling of the
Supreme Court held his taking of private lands unconstitutional); John Fritze,
“Think Long and Hard”: Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer Pushes Back on
“Court-Packing”,
USA
TODAY,
Apr.
7,
2021,
available
at
121
122
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A different, though related, argument for considering
practical consequences of judicial decisions is identified most
prominently with writings of Professor Alexander Bickel. In a
famous article and book, Bickel championed the “passive
virtues” of forbearance where, in his estimation, the costs of
judicial decision on the merits exceed its benefits.126 While any
short summary cannot do it justice, Bickel’s position was that
judicial review is a “potentially deviant institution in a
democratic society” 127 and can only be made tolerable to the
majority by forms of compromise that show respect for the
dominant place given to majoritarian governance. 128 The Court,
in Bickel’s view, must find ways to avoid making decisions that
will unnecessarily weaken its position as a bulwark against
forces at odds with the rule of law. These ways primarily consist
not in making wrong, unprincipled decisions—the charge
against Justice Roberts’ change of position in West Coast Hotel—
but in avoiding too-early or too-broad pronouncements of
principles that will provoke a substantial portion of the citizenry
to resist their application.129
The problem with Bickel’s approach, as recognized
contemporaneously by Professor Gerald Gunther, is its lack of a
principled anchor. 130 Bickel appreciates the importance of
principled decisionmaking by courts, not least the Supreme
Court, and his avoidance project is justified in part by a hope
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2021/04/07/supreme-courtjustice-stephen-breyer-warns-against-packing-bench/7116124002/ (discussing
problems with proposals to expand Supreme Court); William H. Pryor, Jr.,
Conservatives Should Oppose Expanding the Federal Courts, NY TIMES, Nov. 29,
2017,
available
at
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/29/opinion/conservatives-expandingfederal-courts.html (discussing efforts to expand judgeships on other federal
courts).
126 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (Bobbs-Merrill 1962); Alexander M. Bickel, The
Supreme Court 1960 Term—Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40
(1961) (Passive Virtues).
127 Bickel, Passive Virtues, supra note 126, at 47.
128 BICKEL, supra note 126, at 64–68; Bickel, Passive Virtues, supra note 126, at
49–51.
129 See BICKEL, supra note 126, at 95–97; Bickel, Passive Virtues, supra note 126,
at 49–50, 57.
130 See Gunther, supra note 122, at 3, 7, 10-13.
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that it will guide the Court away from decisions on
constitutional questions that are not grounded in sound, neutral
principles.131 Yet, in choosing which times to elide constitutional
decisions, Bickel relies on a loose set of considerations that lack
any solid superstructure. 132 He appeals to expediency in the
service of principle, but provides no principle to cabin the
Court’s judgment on when to avoid a particular constitutional
issue. What is left is expediency that serves the views of its
advocate at a given moment, freed from significant constraints
that should guide judicial decisions under law.
This raises another reason for questioning the propriety of the
remedial decision in Arthrex and other similar instances of
judicial creativity. Although this is admittedly highly
speculative, it may be that empowering judges to declare Acts
of Congress unconstitutional without visiting serious
consequences on anyone makes the declaration of
unconstitutionality more attractive to the courts. This may be
desirable insofar as it minimizes disruption of government,
instructs future Congresses on the limits of their powers, and
provides the Executive with grounds for disregarding
Congress’s clear, but unconstitutional, commands. These
potential benefits should be weighed against the costs of a
judiciary more willing to impose limits on the other branches in
cases of constitutional doubt. Just as retroactive consequences
that come from application of a decision on the law to the parties
at hand have long been understood as a bulwark against judicial
creativity in private law matters, requiring that courts
immediately face whatever disruption comes with a specific
decision may create headwinds against assertion of new
separation of powers holdings resting on uncertain grounds.
Returning to our concerns with Arthrex illustrates why
Bickel’s “passive virtues” cannot provide justification for the
Court’s remedial choice. The problem identified above with
Arthrex is the Court’s decision to craft a remedy that does not
provide any relief to the plaintiff—after finding that the law at
issue unconstitutionally granted final decisional authority to
APJs. The Court did not avoid declaring that the law Congress
131
132

See Bickel, Passive Virtues, supra note 126, at 47-51.
See Gunther, supra note 122, at 11–13, 16–17, 20–21, 24–25.
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designed (and, with presidential concurrence, enacted) could
not stand. Instead, it merely avoided imposing a remedy that
would require congressional action to put the inter partes
review mechanism on constitutional footing.
(2) True versus Faux Avoidance: A Role for “Constitutional
Chevron”?
Bickel recognized that the Supreme Court can, in fact, avoid a
thorny constitutional problem by refusing to grant petitions for
certiorari raising the problem. 133 The Court can wait until the
lower courts have had time and opportunity to consider the
problem in different settings with different fact patterns. The
Court can wait to see whether the arguments for and against a
given legal principle evolve as cases raising the problem arrive
in other courts at different times.134
The passage of time might allow courts access to more than
simply greater information on where and how the problem
might arise. It also might see arguments about the problem
change as lawyers and scholars think of new aspects of the
problem, new edges that connect to other legal issues and
doctrines, or new ways of conceiving issues addressed by a
formerly well-accepted doctrine. 135 Delaying resolution of a
problem also might permit more clear-sighted engagement with
principle in addressing that task, as public passions on some
aspect of the problem cool.136 In the end, waiting to confront the
issue may improve the Court’s resolution of it.
Beyond the accretion of information and reduced concern
with the public’s willingness to accept a proper resolution of the
See, e.g., Bickel, Passive Virtues, supra note 126, at 46, 51, 52.
See Michael Coenen & Seth Davis, Percolation’s Value, 73 STAN. L. REV. 363
(2021); William H. Rehnquist, The Changing Role of the Supreme Court, 14 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 1, 11 (1986).
135 With respect to the evolution of constitutional law doctrines, see, for
examples, Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an
Anachronism (with Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U.
L. REV. 593 (1990); William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
136 See Gunther, supra note 122, at 22, 25 (praising the instincts behind some
of Professor Bickel’s cautions about deciding issues too soon, while also
criticizing the unprincipled nature of other aspects of Bickel’s argument).
133
134
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constitutional problem, there may be an improvement in the
Court’s appreciation of legal principles that might frame a
solution. The point is not that the Constitution changes over time
or that justices should look to current public views to anchor
constitutional interpretation. Rather, it is that appreciating the
way legal doctrines encapsulate constitutional commands can
change over time, even for those whose lodestar is the
Constitution’s original meaning. 137 Think, for example, of the
justices’ commentary on Korematsu 138 decades removed from
World War II139 or on the Sedition Act more than 165 years after
its passage, 140 commentary that reflects changed ways of
thinking as much as distance from potentially hostile public
responses. These changes can be better incorporations of
original understandings as opposed to being based on new
conceptions of constitutional language. 141 Regardless of
137 Cf. Gunther, supra note 122 (explaining how deferring some questions
until properly presented in a concrete context can improve decisions, but
arguing against deferring judgment where a case already presents such a
context); Harold Leventhal, A Modest Proposal for a Multi-Circuit Court of
Appeals, 24 AM. U. L. REV. 881, 907 (1975) (explaining, inter alia, the value of
percolation broadly for development of the law). By and large, the value of
allowing arguments respecting particular positions on legal issues to evolve
and sharpen over time holds even in settings, such as Arthrex, where the issue
is likely to be addressed only by a single lower court (there, the Federal
Circuit). Given changes in both personnel and the arguments that might be put
forward—or the manner in which they are made—delay may improve the
decision being made on the issue.
138 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the U.S.
government’s forced removal of Japanese citizens and immigrants of Japanese
descent to internment camps during the course of World War II) (Korematsu).
139 See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (stating that it is
“obvious” that “Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was decided, has
been overruled in the court of history, and—to be clear—“has no place in law
under the Constitution” (citing Justice Robert Jackson’s dissent in Korematsu)).
140 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964) (declaring
that, although the Sedition Act of 1798, 1 Stat. 596, was never held
unconstitutional in a court of law, “the attack upon its validity has carried the
day in the court of history”).
141 See Ronald A. Cass, Weighing Constitutional Anchors: New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan and the Misdirection of First Amendment Doctrine, 12 FIRST AMEND. L.
REV. 399, 416–21 (2014); Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 75, at 37–47; Frederick
Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L.
REV. 265 (1981). Again, our focus here is not on the choice of interpretive
methodology but on potential gains from deferring decision on some
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methodological inclination, judicious use of the Court’s ability
to control a docket almost entirely assembled at the justices’
discretion may allow an approach akin to the 1970s commercials
of Paul Masson Wines, in which Orson Welles intoned, “We will
sell no wine before its time.”142
It is wrong, however, to conflate actual avoidance of
constitutional questions—of having to confront a question
before the justices feel ready to resolve it; as it were, “before its
time”—with the use of techniques that merely appear to avoid
decision.143 Some doctrines often characterized as doctrines of
avoidance, such as the political question doctrine, in fact resolve
constitutional issues. The political question doctrine holds that
specific decisions are constitutionally delegated to the discretion
of Congress or the President or both.144 If there is a constitutional
question appropriate for judicial resolution, it does not extend
to what is inside the scope of discretionary judgment assigned
to the coordinate branches of government. This form of what
might be termed “constitutional Chevron” analysis appropriately
allows courts to decide the judicially necessary interpretive issue
while recognizing the scope of discretion granted elsewhere. 145
constitutional questions. (Among other reasons, differences between our own
views respecting the best interpretive methodology preclude advocacy of one
specific methodology.)
142 See Orson Welles’ 1978 Paul Masson Wine Commercial, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PUunRgUkRjQ.
143 See Gunther, supra note 122, at 15–17 (making point with respect to Bickel’s
arguments, especially his reliance on Justice Louis Brandeis’s Ashwander rules
for decision on Supreme Court jurisdiction, taken from Ashwander v. TVA,
297 U.S. 288, 345–48 (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
144 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277 (2004) (declaring that a political
question is an issue “that the judicial department has no business entertaining
. . . because the question is entrusted to one of the political branches or involves
no judicially enforceable rights.”); Rucho v. Common Cauise, 139 S. Ct. 2484,
2500 (2019) (concluding that partisan gerrymandering claims are political
questions due to the lack of clear governing legal standards).
145 For explanation and analysis of the operation of review under the formula
articulated in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984), see Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment
Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42
CONN. L. REV. 779, 781–87 (2010) (describing the scope of the Court’s
authority as originally intended in Chevron, and later exploring the ways
Chevron has been implemented and problems with its implementation);
Clark Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretation of Statutes: An
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To be clear, we use the term “constitutional Chevron” here
to denote a decision by courts on whether an institution of
governance has been given discretion, followed by deference
(of some dimension) to the institution’s decision in its
exercise of discretion. This is the essence of administrative
law’s Chevron. 146 One difference between Chevron and the
political question doctrine is that political questions at times
primarily involve disputes between the other two branches
of government, while Chevron more directly implicates the
division of authority between the Executive Branch and the
courts. 147 Still, the issue for judicial disposition in both
instances is the extent to which a matter properly has been
delegated to one or another part of the government.
Analysis of Chevron’s Step Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 255, 262–63, 266–67 (1988)
(arguing for a more nuanced analysis in step-two of Chevron to ensure
agencies remain within their statutory authority); Ronald A. Cass, Is
Chevron’s Game Worth the Candle? Burning Interpretation at Both Ends, in
LIBERTY’S NEMESIS: THE UNCHECKED EXPANSION OF THE STATE 57 (Dean Reuter &
John Yoo eds., 2016) (arguing that, because of the decision’s imprecise
language, Chevron in practice often diverges from actual and defensible
Chevron analysis); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?: Implied
Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54
ADMIN. L. REV. 735, 742–43 (2002); Gary Lawson & Stephen Kam, Making Law
out of Nothing at All: The Origins of the Chevron Doctrine, 65 ADMIN. L. REV.
1, 3–5 (2013) (explaining how Chevron transformed from mere restatement
of established law to a new deference test); Thomas W. Merrill, The Story
of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental Landmark, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
STORIES 398, 398–402 (Peter L. Strauss ed., Foundation Press 2006) (same);
Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511, 512–16 (1989) (examining different justifications for Chevron
deference).
146 See Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996); Beermann,
supra note 145, at 871–72; Ronald A. Cass, Auer Deference: Doubling Down on
Delegation’s Defects Doctrine for the Modern Administrative State, 87 FORDHAM L.
REV. 531, 543–44 (2018); Lawson & Kam, supra note 145, at 3–5; Scalia, supra
note 145, at 512–14.
147 This is not to say either that disposition of matters as political questions
always involves divisions among the political branches or that treatment of a
matter as a political question does not have implications for the scope of
judicial authority. Rather, the statement in text reflects the fact that the
treatment of a matter as presenting a political question states a conclusion
about the constitutional assignment of a matter to a branch other than the
judiciary. See, e.g., John Harrison, The Political Question Doctrines, 67 AM. U. L.
REV. 457, 460–85 (2017). The essential question in Chevron’s application is how
much authority Congress has assigned to executive officials.
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Neither the sort of judgment represented by the Supreme
Court’s disposition of petitions for certiorari nor the sort
represented by determination that a matter raises a political
question applies to Arthrex. It surely is possible that the plurality
in Arthrex endeavored to limit the degree to which the Court
would impose on Congress and the President an obligation
legislatively to reconstitute the inter partes review process. The
Arthrex remedy, thus, may reflect a genuine effort to limit
intrusion on the other branches. Viewed this way, the Court’s
view was that, within constitutional strictures, Congress and the
President are free to tailor working arrangements for APJs. In
keeping with that view, the justices doubtless endeavored to
keep as much as they could of the existing legislative scheme.
After finding the APJs’ appointment unconstitutional,
however, the approach most respectful of other branches’
domain is to leave the tailoring to them. Rather than avoid a
constitutional question or deem a matter within another
branch’s discretion, Arthrex first answered the constitutional
question and then took on the responsibility that lay within the
other branches’ purview. No matter what motivated the Arthrex
decision, including preserving the other branches’ work so far
as possible, the result was at odds with the sort of judgment
represented by both avoidance and deference regimes. Here, the
passive virtues were passive indeed.
(3) What the Arthrex Approach Might Do
Putting aside questions respecting the fit between Arthrex’s
remedy and jurisdictional limitations on courts, what are the
consequences of this approach for legislative and judicial
decisionmaking? The approach raises potential problems for
both legislative and judicial behavior.
On the legislative side, an expanded scope for the Court could
enable Congress to ignore problems, both constitutional and
otherwise, with the statutes it produces. After all, if members of
Congress can count on courts to reconfigure legislation to pass
constitutional muster, why should legislators take the trouble,
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and the political risks, of fashioning the requisite compromises
themselves?148
On the judicial side, deploying remedial measures that save at
least parts of the legislative product may serve as a sort of
“release valve” for the Court as well. That is, the justices may be
willing to fashion bolder substantive constitutional rules—rules
that sweep more broadly against existing legislation—if their
remedial decisions permit them simultaneously to soften the
rules’ immediate impact. In this sense, it is possible that, if its
approach is followed in other cases, Arthrex will have the
opposite effect from limiting interference with other branches’
prerogatives.
We do not predict that there will be great changes in either the
Congress’s behavior or the Court’s. Legislators do not often
seem duly, much less unduly, troubled by the prospect that their
work-product could be constitutionally suspect. Moreover,
legislators may gain political advantage in passing legislation
that is later overturned, reverting the issues that led to
legislation once again to the law-making process. As Professor
Fred McChesney observed, politicians may benefit from
repeated opportunities to impose rules favorable or unfavorable
to particular constituencies.149 There may be occasions when the
benefits of crafting legislation are reduced sufficiently by the
prospect of judicial reversal to undermine the interests of
legislators and, perhaps, the public as well. We do not, however,
have a basis for predicting that the net result of this effect would
be detrimental to the public.
Similarly, although it is a genuine concern, we think it
unlikely that judicial behavior would be much affected by an
expansion of Arthrex’s remedial approach. If some justices on
some occasions might feel emboldened to adopt rules that
normally would have immediate effects the justices are hesitant
148 While raising that question, we do not assume a conclusive answer to
what the impact of judicial declarations of unconstitutionality—past or
expected in the future—will be with respect to congressional lawmaking. It
well might, as suggested above, alter the compromises struck in legislating, or
it might leave those unaffected. See, e.g., Schauer, Ashwander, supra note 74, at
92.
149 See Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic
Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1987).
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to countenance, there might equally be others who will be
concerned about the consequences of departures from the norms
of ordinary rule adoption and application. That is, for every
justice encouraged to expand adoption of broad rules, there may
be another justice pushed in exactly the opposite direction.
In the end, we cannot with confidence criticize the remedial
approach of Arthrex for its likely consequences on either
legislative or judicial behavior. We can, however, reprove the
failure to grant meaningful relief to a successful plaintiff as
undermining the basis—recognized by Hamilton150 and by Chief
Justice Marshall’s opinion in Marbury—for permitting judicial
review of legislation’s constitutionality. We also question
whether creativity in fashioning separation of powers remedies
is consistent with the current conception—and, in our view, the
constitutionally correct prescription—of the proper judicial role.
V. CONCLUSION
Although this is a difficult issue with legitimate
considerations pointing in opposite directions, we are convinced
that the decision in Arthrex would have been easier to accept if
the Court had struck down the PTAB process and left it to
Congress to decide what steps to take. Congress might have
chosen to resurrect the process with review by the Director or
perhaps might have opted for decision by another agency
appellate body composed of principal officers. This remedy
would have vindicated Arthrex’s interest in preserving its
patent while minimizing what looks like judicial assumption of
a legislative role.
To be clear, our objection is not to the particular structure the
Court chose in Arthrex. There are numerous examples in federal
law in which the ultimate decision for the Executive Branch in
an adjudicatory matter is reserved to a Department Head or
other principal officer or officers.151 In fact, that is the dominant
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
With regard to most agencies, Congress delegates decisionmaking power
to the agency head who then creates a structure within the agency under which
initial decisions are rendered by other officials. In the case of adjudication,
these include, in various agencies, Administrative Law Judges (ALJs),
Administrative Judges, Administrative Patent Judges, and Immigration
150
151
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structural arrangement across multiple substantive areas. Just as
rulemaking in agencies is best conceived as a part of the
executive process rather than a substitute for actual lawmaking,
adjudication in agencies should be conceived as a part of the
executive process and not a substitute for judicial
decisionmaking by courts. With that in mind, perhaps review by
the PTAB Director is the best fix for the statute’s infirmities, both
as fitting the constitutional place of agency decisionmaking and
fitting the statutory framework as well. Even so, we think the
mechanic in this case—the one adjusting the law to fit
constitutional commands—should be Congress, not the
Supreme Court.

Judges. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 193, 194 (granting Secretary of Agriculture power
to issue final orders under the Packers and Stockyards Act). See also Kent
Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1643 (2016)
(describing the range and operation of various administrative judges,
especially those not within the protections accorded to ALJs). The power to
subdelegate also includes the power to reserve the right to exercise directly the
authority originally delegated to the superior officer. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C.
§1003(g)(2); 8 C.F.R. §1003.1(h)(1); Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I&N Dec. 271 (A.G
2018) (Attorney General has authority to certify immigration cases for direct
personal review). With respect to ALJ adjudications, the APA specifies that on
review of an initial decision by an ALJ, the agency head retains “all the powers
which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the
issues on notice or by rule.” 5 U.S.C. §557(b). The statute governing inter partes
review of patents, and review of other decisions regarding patents, however,
specifies decisionmaking by PTAB, not by the Secretary of Commerce. See 35
U.S.C. §6. See also 35 U.S.C. §1609 (specifying review of trademark examiners’
decisions by Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, not Secretary of Commerce).
This vesting of ultimate pre-judicial review decisionmaking authority in the
PTAB and not in the Secretary of Commerce may indicate that Congress would
have been less likely to accept review of patent and trademark decisions by
any other Executive Branch official to preserve the systems’ functionality.

